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tice Powell ignored that no search warrant had issued at any
time-a fact that could have served as a more persuasive basis for
distinction. This failure to comment may indicate that the absence
of a search warrant is not important to a majority of the Court and
leads to one of two conclusions: Either the Court is encouraging
warrantless searches in the absence of the traditional exceptions to
the warrant requirement,39 or it recognizes that if search warrants
are required, the police will simply fabricate them. Nevertheless,
the requirement of a warrant seems the most significant way to
restrict Calandra. A second limitation would be to grant standing
to suppress evidence to all those defendants whom the police reason-
ably expected to be implicated by the illegal search." This would
remove the incentive to violate O's rights and would encourage po-
lice compliance with fourth amendment guarantees, since evidence
gathered in a legal search could still be used. In light of the major-
ity's exclusionary rule analysis, however, adoption of this restriction
does not appear likely.
Of course, the result in United States v. Calandra does not compel
the police to knowingly violate the fourth amendment, nor does it
invite them to do so. But the overbroad conclusion arguably encour-
ages such activity. It may be that the Court felt that the only practi-
cal application of Calandra is in the investigation of organized
crime. The potential for abuse, however, transcends the facts in
Calandra and threatens the right of privacy of all citizens. It is to
be hoped, therefore, that the Court will take the earliest opportunity
to place workable limitations on the Calandra doctrine.
Robert S. Adams
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL COURTS -JUDICIALLY CREATED
REMEDIES-DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT-The
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii has held that
damages are recoverable in a federal action under the Constitution
39. The fourth amendment does not require a search warrant in all cases. It requires only
that searches be reasonable. Thus, the Court has authorized warrantless searches where the
object of the search is highly mobile, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automo-
bile); where the officers are conducting a lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); or are in hot pursuit of a suspect, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).




against United States military personnel for violation of first
amendment rights.
Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973).
Willis Butler and his co-plaintiffs came to Hickam Air Force Base
on August 30, 1972 along with other members of the public who had
come to witness the arrival of President Richard M. Nixon for a
conference with Japanese Premier Tanaka. Butler and those accom-
panying him planned to demonstrate peacefully their opposition to
the President's Vietnam war policies and to his campaign for re-
election. The plaintiffs arrived at the base in three cars. The occu-
pants of the first two cars (plaintiffs-cars A and B) were admitted
to the base but denied access to the area where the President was
to be greeted. They were detained for one and one-half hours, finger-
printed, photographed, and issued form letters barring them from
the base. The third car was stopped at the gate and the occupants
(plaintiffs-car C)l were denied admittance altogether.
Plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii, 3 alleging seven causes of action;4 the first two5
are within the scope of discussion of this note. The first cause of
action, brought under the United States Constitution by plain-
tiffs-cars A and B, against the individual military personnel al-
legedly responsible for their detention and exclusion, sought
money damages for violation of plaintiffs' first,6 fourth7 and fifth
amendment 8 constitutional rights. The second cause of action,
brought by plaintiffs-car C, asked money damages for violation of
their first and fifth amendment rights. Defendants moved for dis-
1. Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 nn.1 & 2 (D. Hawaii 1973).
2. Id. n.3.
3. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interests and
costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
4. 365 F. Supp. at 1038.
5. Id. at 1039.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I, states: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech . ... "
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, reads in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons . . . papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated .... "
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides: "[Nior shall any person . . . be deprived of . . .
liberty . . . without due process of law .... "
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missal and, alternatively, for summary judgment.9 Relying princi-
pally upon Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics'0 and to a lesser degree upon United States ex rel.
Moore v. Koelzer," the court reasoned that the Bivens principle
should be extended to reach violations such as those alleged in the
first and second causes of action and denied defendants' motions for
dismissal and summary judgment.
After acknowledging that the facts alleged in the first cause of
action brought plaintiffs' fourth amendment claim within the prin-
ciples of Bivens, the court cited Moore for the proposition that the
Bivens rationale extended to damages for fifth amendment viola-
tions. The court then abandoned specific discussion of the fourth
and fifth amendment causes of action and took up the problems
presented by the first amendment claim.
The .court stated initially that the "irresistible logic" of Bivens led
to the conclusion that damages are recoverable for first amendment
violations. Beginning with this positive statement, the court pro-
ceeded to counter potential arguments that would seem to refute
this irresistible logic.
The court asserted that first amendment rights were not less im-
portant than fourth or fifth amendment rights," and declared that
the first amendment rights have been historically interrelated with
fourth and fifth amendment rights from their earliest origins.,3 The
9. 365 F. Supp. at 1038.
10. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Bivens]. The Court there held that
damages were recoverable in an action brought under the United States Constitution against
federal officers for violation of plaintiff's fourth amendment rights.
11. 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972). The Moore court held that damages were recoverable in
an action brought under the United States Constitution against federal officers for violations
of plaintiff's fifth amendment rights.
12. 365 F. Supp. at 1039. This is unquestionably true in view of such cases as Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), and Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), which elevated the
first amendment to what must be considered a judicial pedestal, even among constitutional
rights.
13. 365 F. Supp. at 1039, citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965), which quoted
approvingly from the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360, 376 (1959), in support of the perceived relationship.
"The commands of our First Amendment (as well as the prohibitions of the Fourth
and the Fifth) reflect the teachings of Entick v. Carrington [19 Howell's State Trials
1029 (C. P. 1765)] . . . . These three amendments are indeed closely related, safe-
guarding not only privacy and protection against self-incrimination but 'conscience
and human dignity and freedom of expression as well.'"
379 U.S. at 484-85. Entick v. Carrington, referred to in the foregoing quotation as the common
foundation for the first, fourth and fifth amendments, has indeed been frequently so
Vol. 13: 116
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court then noted that first amendment rights are among personal
liberties protected by the fifth amendment due process clause
against federal intervention.' 4
It was admitted by the court that an obvious difference between
the Bivens situation and that presented in the instant case was that
Bivens had had the option of suing in trespass in the state courts,
whereas no parallel state tort actions existed in the area of first
amendment rights.'5 Thus, it was at least arguable that Bivens had
merely recognized the practical convenience of permitting an origi-
nal federal action where a state action was available, but would
usually result in removal to federal court. This reading of Bivens
was, however, flatly rejected in view of the express statement by the
Bivens Court that the fourth amendment limits the conduct of fed-
eral officers whether or not the state would penalize identical con-
duct on the part of a private citizen.'"
Having discovered no reason not to apply Bivens, the court of-
fered two affirmative arguments for extending the principle ad-
vanced in that case. The court pointed out that under 42 U.S.C. §
1983'7 damages are recoverable for the deprivation of first amend-
ment rights under color of state law.' 8 The court found no special
difficulties in the application of similar principles to damage actions
considered; see, e.g., Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1961).
Entick was the editor and publisher of a newspaper believed to be seditious. Three messengers
of the King ransacked his home, confiscating his private papers, and were subsequently sued
for trespass. Their defense of justification was rejected.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Korner, 56 F. Supp. 242, 246-47 (S.D. Cal. 1944). The
Butler court noted the analogous incorporation of first amendment rights into the fourteenth
amendment, resulting from the finding that first amendment freedoms were personal liberties
protected by the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 365 F. Supp. at 1040.
15. 365 F. Supp. at 1040.
16. 403 U.S. at 392.
17. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
18. 365 F. Supp. at 1040 n.12, citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Winters
v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970);
Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970); Fulton v. Emerson Elec. Co., 420 F.2d
527 (5th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Nesmith v. Alford,
318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962); Davis v. Board
of Trustees, 270 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd, 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1968).
It is unclear from the opinion whether this line of cases was cited as an argument for
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 13: 116
against federal officers under the first and fifth amendments."
Moreover, it noted that unnecessary difficulties were presented by
the application of different standards.20
Noting the lack of any practicable alternative remedy, the court
found the damages remedy to be particularly well suited to relief for
first amendment violations such as those alleged. 2' Questions of
good faith and official immunity defenses were reserved for a full
evidentiary hearing."
As the foregoing synopsis indicates, the keystone of the court's
rationale was its reading of Bivens, augmented to some degree by
Moore and by some independent analysis of the compatibility of the
damage remedy with first amendment rights. The Butler court
offered little in the way of explanation for its interpretation of
Bivens; yet, the court's appraisal of this leading case seems accur-
ate.
Prior to Bivens, the problems relating to judicially created reme-
dies for violation of constitutional rights had been thoughtfully ex-
plored by only a few legal commentators, 23 and by even fewer
judges.2" Decisions granted relief,25 seemingly without awareness of
extending Bivens or as an indication of the standards which should apply to the new cause
of action if the Bivens principle is expanded to include first amendment violations. The
placement of the § 1983 discussion with the arguments justifying the new cause of action
supports the former of the two possible readings.
19. 365 F. Supp. at 1040.
20. Id., citing Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973), in contrast to Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3d
Cir. 1971).
21. "Where the occasion for exercising First Amendment rights has passed, h private
damage action affords the only practicable means of redressing the kind of wrong alleged."
365 F. Supp. at 1040.
The court also quoted from the thorough concurrence of Mr. Justice Harlan in Bivens:
[Ilt would be at least anomalous to conclude that the federal judiciary-while compe-
tent to choose among the range of traditional judicial remedies to implement statutory
and common-law policies, and even to generate substantive rules governing primary
behavior in furtherance of broadly formulated policies articulated by statute or Consti-
tution. . . is powerless to accord a damages remedy to vindicate social policies which,
by virtue of their inclusion in the Constitution, are aimed predominantly at restraining
the Government as an instrument of the popular will.
Id. at 1041, quoting 403 U.S. at 403-04.
22. 365 F. Supp. at 1045.
23. Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. Ray. 1109 (1969); Katz, The Jurisprud-
ence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Katz]; 83 HARv. L. Rav. 684 (1970); 48 TEXAS L. REV.
219 (1969).
24. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir.
1969); Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
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the issues that later tantalized legal scholars.2" Others denied the
desired remedy, either without independent analysis27 or on grounds
not relating to the constitutionality or propriety of judge-made con-
stitutional remedies. 8 The availability of injunctive relief was long
taken for granted." Recent attempts at analysis 3l have suggested
that the power to grant injunctive relief may rest upon the absence
of equity jurisdiction early in the history of some state courts. It may
also be implied directly from the Constitution or as a necessary
corollary of the power of judicial review established in Marbury v.
Madison.3
The first case prior to Bivens that drew general attention to the
possibility of awarding damages for deprivation of constitutional
rights was Bell v. Hood."2 In Bell, the Supreme Court held that the
federal courts had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over a claim
for damages asserted against federal officers who had violated plain-
tiffs fourth amendment rights. Decision on the merits was left to
the lower court, which ultimately denied the damage claim.3 3 The
Mapp and Weeks dealt with the unique exclusionary remedy, which has given rise to some
criticism and to some arguments in its favor which are distinct from those relating to the
damage' remedy.
25. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) (taking property without just compensa-
tion remedied by granting just compensation); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902)
(granting damages for denial of right to vote approved).
26. Katz, supra note 23. A partial listing of the many issues debated would include: the
Constitution as a political document v. the Constitution as law; the state tort action as the
proper vehicle for redress v. the federal cause of action; the Congress as the only institution
qualified to grant a damage remedy v. the capacity of the judiciary to do so.
27. Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1957); Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F.
Supp. 582, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 290 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 827 (1961). Both relied upon Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
28. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963) (no constitutional violation demon-
strated); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900) (allegations insufficient to support granting
damages for denial of the right to vote); Holt v. Indiana, 176 U.S. 68 (1900) (amount in
controversy requirement not met); United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 971 (1965) (emphasis on applicability of civil rights statute rather than
on the Constitution); Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1961), af'd, 316 F.2d 1
(9th Cir. 1963) (damages for conscription denied because conscription found not violative of
the Constitution).
29. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (granting an injunction based upon
constitutional violation).
30. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d
718, 723 (2d Cir. 1969).
31. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 60 (1803).
32. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
33. 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
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district court reasoned as follows: The fourth amendment is di-
rected at federal action only. Since the federal government had not
consented to suit, the action necessarily proceeded on the premise
that the officers had exceeded their authority and thus lost official
immunity. The suit, therefore, was in fact directed at the officers
as individuals, to whom the commands of the fourth amendment
were inapplicable. 4 This remarkable reasoning, as one notable com-
mentator pointed out, relies on the erroneous assumption that the
concept of color of federal authority does not exist."
More than a decade and a half elapsed before the question of
damages for fourth amendment violations again reached the Su-
preme Court. In Wheeldin v. Wheeler,3 the Court avoided the ques-
tion by its finding that no fourth amendment violation had oc-
curred.3 1 Scholarly debate persisted, 3 but, prior to Bivens, no court
took occasion to rethink the issue.30
In the interim before Bivens, the related processes of implying
remedies ° and creating remedies4' based upon federal statutes did,
however, receive extensive judicial attention. In these areas, initia-
tive by the judiciary was accepted practice, and rules were devel-
oped to guide the process. The power of the federal courts in this
area had been broadly stated and was thought to be limited only by
boundaries rather clearly imposed by the written law being imple-
mented.4" Generally speaking, remedies would be created where
"necessary" or "appropriate" to effectuate the legislative policy. 3
34. Id. at 817. The doctrine is well established that a federal officer is stripped of official
immunity by virtue of his unlawful act; see, e.g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605
(1912).
35. Katz, supra note 23, at 4. This appraisal was shared by the court of appeals in Bivens,
409 F.2d at 721.
36. 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
37. Id. at 650.
38. See, e.g., note 23 supra.
39. Cases cited notes 27, 28 supra. All rejected the remedy.
40. See, e.g., Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 367 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
41. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956);
Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
42. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jack-
son, J., concurring):
Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is condi-
tioned by them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the traditional
common-law technique of decision and to draw upon all the sources of the common
law in cases such as the present.
Id.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947).
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The court of appeals decision in Bivens was the first thorough
judicial reconsideration of damages for constitutional violations to
emerge." Like all the other post-Bell decisions to that date,45 Bivens
rejected the independent fourth amendment damages claim. It did
so, however, by expressly declining to follow the rationale of the
district court in Bell.4" Instead, it proceeded to carefully analyze the
existing law and policy in the area.
This analysis began with Entick v. Carrington,7 the commonly
acknowledged genesis of the fourth amendment, and other early
English decisions48 which vindicated violations of fourth amend-
ment-type rights through common law trespass actions. The court
reasoned that it was this type of action, initiated in state court, that
the drafters of the amendment contemplated as the means of its
enforcement through private actions. In such actions the fourth
amendment would serve to negate the defense of federal justifica-
tion on the part of any federal official. The court rejected the notion
that the drafters necessarily intended to establish a new federal
cause of action to vindicate violation of the rights created by the
amendment. 9 In support of this viewpoint, it noted that general
jurisdiction over cases based upon the presence of a federal question
did not even exist at the time the amendment was drafted.50
Acknowledging that general federal question jurisdiction now ex-
isted, and that the federal courts had on rare occasions formulated
remedies for violation of federal statutes which failed to specify a
method to vindicate the statutory policy, the court admitted that
the same power would appear to exist with regard to the Constitu-
tion.-' Three situations were cited in which the power to devise
constitutional remedies seemingly had been recognized .2 Generally,
44. 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969).
45. Cases cited notes 27, 28 supra.
46. 409 F.2d at 720.
47. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765).
48. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768
(K.B. 1763).
49. 409 F.2d at 721.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 722.
52. Id. at 724. The first was the injunction for threatened or continuing constitutional
violations. The court suggested that this remedy had developed in part from the lack of equity
jurisdiction in many states, and in part as a necessary concomitant of the power of judicial
review established by Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 60 (1803). Neither of these
bases existed in the Bivens situation.
1974
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however, the court was convinced that without some statutory
basis5 3 for granting the remedy, the judiciary should not embark
upon the formulation of a damage remedy that was not absolutely
essential."
With this foundation, the Bivens case reached the Supreme
Court, which held that violation of the fourth amendment by federal
officers gave rise to a cause of action for damages." In the Court's
view, restricting plaintiff to the common law action of trespass and
relegating the utility of the fourth amendment to a rebuttal of the
defense of federal justification were inconsistent with the nature of
the fourth amendment prohibition. The amendment reached con-
duct that would not necessarily be violative of state law if engaged
in by a private citizen. 6 Normally, an individual who demanded
entry into another's house on the strength of his own authority
would not be liable in trespass if the owner admitted him.57 Yet,
such an unauthorized demand and entry by a federal official would
be clearly violative of the amendment. The state law, however,
could not take into account the different status of the federal offi-
cial, for to do so would be, in effect, to limit the exercise of federal
authority.58 Thus, some fourth amendment violations would have
remedies while others, just as reprehensible in terms of constitu-
tional guarantee, would be completely without redress. The Court
found the double limitation inherent in state causes of action to be
an unavoidable stumbling block in the rationale of the court of
appeals,5 1 and the inevitable foundation for a federal cause of action.
Having established that plaintiff had stated a valid cause of ac-
tion, the Court declared that damages were the ordinary remedy for
The second situation was exemplified by Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933), in
which the Supreme Court read the fifth amendment right to just compensation as self-
executing. The remedy implication was in that way unique to that amendment.
The third situation was the rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment, developed in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court found that
the remedy created was essential, since without it the right would remain only a "form of
words".
53. The court suggested that a possible statutory remedy, under what is now 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1970), explained the decisions in Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902), and Wiley
v. Sinkler, 179 U.S.'58 (1900), discussed at notes 25, 28 supra.
54. 409 F.2d at 726.
55. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
56. Id. at 392.
57. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 18, at 101 (4th ed. 1971).
58. 403 U.S. at 395.
59. 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969).
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a violation of personal interests in liberty." In support of this the
Court cited several cases concerning damages for deprivation of
voting rights.' The court found no further "special factors counsel-
ling hesitation"62 and disagreed with the proposition that damages
should be available only if essential to the enforcement of the
amendment.
Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a separate concurrence, reasoning from
the premise that the interest claimed by the plaintiff was federally
protected. 3 There was no question, in his opinion, that a federal
remedy was proper. The true problem was whether the Constitution
itself limited the creation of such remedies to Congress. Analyzing
and analogizing developments in the area of judicial remedies for
violation of federal regulatory statutes, Harlan concluded that a
judicially created damage remedy was proper in this instance."
What emerges from the Bivens opinions is a rationale that pro-
ceeds as follows: The Bill of Rights creates certain unique individual
interests in liberty that are federally protected and that require
federal remedies. Personal interests in liberty are normally vindi-
cated by a recovery of damages, a remedy that the federal courts
have demonstrated their capability to fashion. This rationale ap-
plies as readily to the first amendment case 5 as to the fourth
amendment case. Bivens clearly recognized that the federal judici-
ary has the power to create remedies for constitutional wrongs that
would otherwise go without adequate redress, just as the judiciary
has this power in regard to federal statutes not specifying a remedy.
What is unclear from the majority opinion is the standard to be
applied in determining whether the judiciary should exercise this
power in a given instance.66
The very stringent test advocated by the court of appeals, i.e.,
that the remedy must be absolutely essential to prevent the right
60. 403 U.S. at 395.
61. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Swafford
v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900).
62- 403 U.S. at 396.
63. Id. at 400.
64. Id. at 405.
65. See, e.g., Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973).
66. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HAuv. L. REv.
1532 (1972).
Given the existence of judicial power to formulate compensatory remedies directly
from the Constitution, there still remains the central and difficult question of articu-
lating standards to govern the Court's discretion in exercising that power. In Bivens,
1974
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from becoming "a mere form of words," 7 was rejected."8 The Su-
preme Court indicated that this test was inappropriate where Con-
gress had not expressly prohibited the damage remedy and that
emphasis would be better shifted to the individual whose personal
rights had been violated." Harlan, concurring, likewise emphasized
the situation of the individual and the efficacy of the remedies avail-
able to him,7" and advocated granting the relief sought if "neces-
sary" or "appropriate" to the vindication of the personal interest
asserted.7' Adopting the "necessary" or "appropriate" test of Justice
Harlan, or merely looking to the range of remedies available to the
plaintiff whose first amendment interests have been invaded, as
suggested by the majority opinion, it becomes clear that the re-
sponse of the Butler court is justified by Bivens. As was noted by
the court in Butler, refusal to create a remedy would leave plaintiff
with a right in a vacuum. No alternative form of redress was avail-
able.72
Whether other factors, such as the existence of a parallel tradi-
tional cause of action, should be considered in granting relief was
not specifically discussed by the majority. As the Butler court sug-
gested, however, this may have been an unspoken. premise underly-
ing the assertion that an award of damages was an ordinary remedy
for the type of wrong inflicted in Bivens. Harlan's concurrence
suggested, by implication at least, that the existence of a parallel
tort might serve to guide the judiciary in constructing a remedy, but
there is no suggestion that this should be a prerequisite to remedy
creation." As the Butler court perceived, the majority's clear impli-
the Court proceeded as if that question answered itself, and, although its decision
provides the federal courts with a potentially powerful tool, there is very little instruc-
tion on how or when it is to be used.
Id. at 1543.
67. 409 F.2d 718, 724 (1969).
68. 403 U.S. at 397.
69. 403 U.S. at 397. The court quoted Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 60, 69
(1803), "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury."
70. 403 U.S. at 409-10.
71. Id. at 407.
72. 365 F. Supp. at 1040. Although it is conceivable that a false imprisonment claim would
succeed, such a recovery would not, of course, serve to vindicate the peculiar injury to first
amendment rights that plaintiffs alleged. The opportunity for injunctive relief, moreover, had
passed.
73. 403 U.S. at 395.
74. Id. at 408-09.
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cation was that the federal remedy was all the more desirable be-
cause no state-created interest was truly equivalent." Moreover, the
citation of voting rights cases," as examples of the proposition that
damages were the ordinary remedy for violation of personal interests
in liberty, clearly indicates that the existence of some parallel tort
did not govern the propriety of the damage remedy."
The question of what the Bivens Court referred to as "special
factors counselling hesitation" remains. The factors enumerated by
the Bivens Court were as follows: questions of federal fiscal policy,78
cases of mere excess of an otherwise valid authority delegated by
Congress,7" and cases where Congress had affirmatively prohibited
remedies other than those which it had sanctioned .8 None of these
factors were present in Bivens, nor did they confront the Butler
court. Apart from these factors, might the lack of a parallel tradi-
tional tort, even though not an absolute bar to remedy creation,
constitute still another "special factor counselling hesitation"?
Although an affirmative answer to this question does not in itself
imply that the remedy should not be given, the answer in this case
must certainly be affirmative. Policy problems, given scant atten-
tion by the Bivens majority, loom somewhat larger where no similar
cause of action has existed at common law. Such problems include
those associated with the development of subsidiary law, e.g., the
measure of damages; those associated with increased volume of liti-
gation; and those resulting from the burdening of federal officers
with a liability that may serve to deter proper vigor in the perform-
ance of official duties.8'
It was perhaps in contemplation of problems of this sort that the
court in Butler cited cases granting damages under § 1983 for viola-
tion of first amendment rights under color of state law." This line
of cases does indeed furnish a kind of parallel, which may serve as
a guide to the federal judiciary in the formulation of ancillary law.
More importantly, it furnishes an affirmative incentive to extend a
75. Id. at 392.
76. Cases cited note 61 supra.
77. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
78. 403 U.S. at 396.
79. Id. at 397.
80. Id.
81. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HA'sv. L. REv.
1532, 1543 (1972).
82. 365 F. Supp. at 1040.
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similar liability to federal officers, an incentive which counterbal-
ances to some degree the perceived difficulties. To allow federal
officers greater freedom than state officers to violate personal liber-
ties is an incongruity that is offensive to our concept of justice
within the federal system.8
An unfortunate shortcoming of the line of § 1983 cases cited is
that although damages are certainly being awarded for first amend-
ment violations, the practice has never been well analyzed by the
courts, and the cases do not furnish a particularly informative pre-
cedent."4 Where parallel traditional torts exist, as in Bivens, the
federal courts generally have centuries of precedent on which to
draw. Ancillary law has developed some degree of detail in order to
meet the problems pinpointed by so many years' experience with
the particular cause of action. If shortcomings and anomalies exist
in the tort law they are generally well recognized. This type of pro-
tracted development and change has not yet occurred with the §
1983 cause of action for violation of free expression. Practical and
philosophical problems under this cause of action may certainly be
envisioned but are still, for the most part, in the realm of potentiali-
ties. Some may never materialize and others, lurking unforeseen,
may yet arise. One thing that may be said for the line of first amend-
ment § 1983 cases is that they certainly have not unleashed an
unmanageable wave of litigation, for they have been relatively infre-
quent thus far.
The ultimate answer probably lies, as Harlan suggested, with the
cases where the courts have fashioned remedies for federal regula-
tory statutes.' New and unparalleled causes of action have regularly
been recognized in order to fully effectuate statutory policy. To do
83. 48 TEXAS L. REV. 219 (1969).
The fact that congressional oversight has left a hiatus in the law hardly seems a
satisfactory explanation for judicial restraint. It seems totally incongruous that a fed-
eral officer may presently violate the federal rights of a citizen with impunity while a
state officer may be held liable for the very same actions under the civil rights acts.
Id. at 224.
84. Cf. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw.
U.L. REV. 277, 305-07 (1965), which discussed first amendment claims under § 1983 as
"unique situations," and suggested that "the statute should also be given play to operate in
cases involving first amendment rights." Id. at 329. The implication from this is that the
existing cases did not firmly assert § 1983 protection for these rights. Development in this
area has subsequently occurred, but still no comprehensive body of appellate level opinions
exists to furnish guidelines for the judiciary on question of public policy and of ancillary law.
85. 403 U.S. at 410-11.
Vol. 13: 116
Recent Decisions
less in furtherance of constitutional rights would by implication
express a value judgment on the importance of these rights in com-
parison to rights created by statute.
Although the primary focus of this note is on the Butler court's
treatment of the first amendment claim, its handling of the related
fifth amendment claim merits mention in light of the principles just
developed. In Moore,"6 the decision cited by the Butler court in
support of its decision to sustain the fifth amendment claim, the
plaintiff had filed a pro se complaint alleging that defendant agents
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and defendant Assistant
United States Attorney had falsified a legal document and procured
false testimony in a criminal prosecution of the plaintiff, and that
these actions were racially motivated. The court found sufficient
allegations of fifth amendment violations to support a damage ac-
tion, and asserted that Bivens recognized a cause of action for dam-
ages for violation of constitutionally protected interests and was not
limited to fourth amendment violations.87
It would appear that Moore is not sufficiently authoritative to
support the weight that the Butler court has asked it to bear. To
accept Moore's conclusionary statement without independent anal-
ysis is to ignore the many questions that have been briefly indicated
in the foregoing analysis of the first amendment claim. One obvious
question that went completely unasked, both by the Moore and
Butler courts, is whether alternative remedies exist. That a court
has power to create a remedy does not necessarily mean that it is
wise to do so.
The trend in the federal courts, as exemplified by Butler, is to-
ward a greater participation by the judiciary in the vindication of
personal rights. This activism received Supreme Court sanction in
the Bivens case because it was believed that full protection of indi-
vidual interests in liberty required judicial as well as congressional
participation, and that the judiciary had been vested with the power
to assume the task.8 The Supreme Court there asserted further that
the judiciary had the necessary acumen to make the policy judg-
86. United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972).
87. Id. at 894. The court cited Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1971), which held
that allegations of fourth and fifth amendment violations stated a valid cause of action. That
case, like Moore, did not offer an analysis in support of its holding, but relied upon Bivens.
88. 403 U.S. at 396.
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ments inherent in remedy-making.n Butler is at least the third 0
decision since Bivens to expand the concept that was shaped there.
The extension appears appropriate in light of the relevant consider-
ations discussed here, and is consistent with Bivens.
Yet, the judiciary is not institutionally equipped, as is the legisla-
ture, to step into each and every perceived breach, weigh the
delicate balancing policies and weave its remedial web. It is true
that the courts can analyze policy and that they can and should
fashion remedies where remedies are required and justified. How-
ever, the judicial power is qualitatively different from the legislative
power, and the courts are unquestionably more restricted in terms
of time and resources available for remedy-making than is the Con-
gress. The judiciary should shoulder its responsibility for the protec-
tion of the individual and vindication of the Constitution willingly,
but should never do so without a clear understanding of what is
required for the vindication of the constitutional rights involved and
of the limitations of its own energies and talents. Evidence of such
an understanding is not obvious on a reading of Butler, and this, as
well as the actual decision rendered by the. court, is significant. As
the court demonstrated by its own reliance on the Moore holding,
the effects of any holding, even one lacking a verbalized rationale,
can have quite far-reaching effects in this developing area of the
law.
Susan K. Wright
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTEC-
TION-VOTING RIGHTS OF Ex-FELONS-The United States Supreme
Court has held that California's disenfranchisement of convicted
felons who have completed their sentences and paroles did not vio-
late the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Richardson v. Ramirez, 94 S. Ct. 2655 (1974).
When, in 1972, the individual respondents Ramirez, Lee and Gill
attempted to register to vote in their respective counties, their ap-
89. Id.
90. It joins United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972) and Bethea
v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1971).
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